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I.  INTRODUCTION
The case of Akenzua v. Secretary of State for the Home Department1 concerned the 
death of a woman, Ms Zena Laws, at the hands of a man who had been imprisoned for 
armed robbery and who asserted that he was also a multiple murderer.   Ms Laws’ 
administrators were successful in their appeal against the decision that their action for 
compensation should be struck out as having no chance of success.  The report of the 
case in The Times followed the eye-catching headline: ‘Likely victim need not be 
known until harm done’.   This was sufficient to prompt a mental comparison with 
Palmer v Tees Health Authority2 - a case involving the murder of a child by a known 
paedophile in which a similar claim was rejected under the comparable headline: 
‘Health authority too remote from victim’.
Despite their apparent similarity, the two cases are, of course, fundamentally 
different, the former having been argued on the juristic basis of misfeasance in public 
office and the latter in negligence.  The purposes of this paper are, first, to compare 
the two causes of action from the viewpoint of medical law; second, to consider 
whether misfeasance in public office can or could be applied to an NHS Trust today;3
finally, to speculate as to whether Mrs Palmer might have been successful had she 
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taken the misfeasance pathway and, as a corollary, to consider whether we are likely 
to be confronted with an alternative to the medical negligence suit in the future.
II. THE CASES
A. Akenzua and Coy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and the 
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis
Ms Akenzua and Ms Coy were the administrators of the estate of Marcia Laws who 
was murdered by Delroy Denton.   Denton entered the country on a false passport and 
was allowed to remain for 6 months.   His true identity was disclosed at an interview 
following his arrest on a charge of possession of drugs with intent to supply, when it 
was established that he had been imprisoned in his home country of Jamaica 
following a life of violent crime.  It followed that he had no right to be in the United 
Kingdom.
The immigration officer concerned, however, arranged for Denton to become 
a police informer and he was released from detention by way of temporary admission 
to the United Kingdom.  He provided valuable information but was arrested on a 
charge of rape some 7 months after his original interview; the charge was dropped.   
Meantime, Denton was applying for asylum – presumably at the instigation of the 
immigration officer.  This was refused but the notice was not served for another year, 
the inference being that this was deliberate.   During that time, he murdered Ms Laws.  
The later history of the case makes fascinating reading but has no real relevance to the 
present discussion.
Ms Laws’ representatives sued the relevant authorities on the grounds that her 
death was an actionable consequence of misfeasance in public office by one or more 
of their officials or officers. The judge struck out the claim on the grounds that there 
was insufficient proximity between the victim and the alleged wrongdoers, since the 
risk they were alleged to have created was a risk to the public at large and not 
specifically to his eventual victim.  However, the Three Rivers action was progressing 
at the time and reached the House of Lords before Ms Akenzua’s appeal against the 
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striking out was heard.4   In the event, therefore, the Court of Appeal was in a position 
to apply the law of misfeasance as it was interpreted by the Lords of Appeal in Three 
Rivers. We discuss this in detail below. Of particular note are Lord Steyn’s 
observations as to the risk to a class of persons of which the plaintiff was a member;5  
this, he thought, should be regarded as an expansive rather than a restrictive element 
of the tort: ‘...allowing the action to be maintained even where the identities of the 
eventual victims are not known at the time when the tort is committed, so long as it is 
clear that there will be such victims’.6  
B. Palmer v. Tees Health Authority7
Armstrong was a man with a disturbed childhood.  He was in the care of the 
defendants’ medical and nursing staff between 1992 and 1994 and was diagnosed as 
suffering from personality disorder or psychopathic personality.   He had stated 
during an admission to hospital in 1993 that he had sexual feelings towards children 
and that a child would be murdered after his discharge.  He was discharged as an 
outpatient in 1993 and was last seen at the hospital in February 1994.  On 30th June 
1994, he sexually assaulted and murdered Rosie Palmer, aged 4.
Mrs Palmer, as her daughter’s administratrix, brought an action in negligence 
against the Health Authority alleging that it failed to diagnose that there was ‘a real, 
substantial and foreseeable risk’ of his committing serious sexual offences against 
children and that they failed to provide any adequate treatment to reduce the risk of 
him committing such offences and/or to prevent his being released from hospital 
whilst he was at risk of committing such offences.
At first instance, the judge (Gage J.) struck out the action and Mrs Palmer 
progressed to the Court of Appeal where it was agreed that the injuries to her daughter 
were foreseeable; the issue was, essentially, one of proximity.   Stuart-Smith L.J. 
dismissed the suggestion that foreseeability, proximity and fairness were all ‘facets of 
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the same thing’ and that, if the court was required to establish the facts on one ground, 
the implication was that the facts must be established on all three.  The apparently 
supportive opinions in Osman8 and Barrett9 did not apply in that proximity was not at 
issue in either of these cases; rather, the definitive decision was that of Hill v. Chief 
Constable of West Yorkshire10 in which the crucial point was that there was no 
relationship between the defendant - i.e. the police - and the victim.  Stuart-Smith L.J. 
went on to say:
It seems to me to be a relevant consideration to ask what the defendant 
could have done to avoid the danger, if the suggested precautions …. 
or treatment are likely to be of doubtful effectiveness, and the most 
effective precaution [to give warning to the victim] cannot be taken 
because the defendant does not know who to warn.  This consideration 
suggests to me that the Court would be unwise to hold that there is 
sufficient proximity.11
The Lord Justice did, however, reserve his position as to what would be the 
appropriate test if the victim in such a case was identified or identifiable.12   It is also 
to be noted that Pill L.J. had grave doubts as to the logic behind defining a duty of 
care in terms of  the identity of the victim of physical injury by a third party.    
Nevertheless, the appeal failed and the action was struck out.
The door is not, however, quite closed. We have already noted Stuart-Smith 
L.J.’s uncertainty and we have, for example, Gage J. at first instance in Palmer13  
pointing out that, although no success could be expected when the victim was 
unidentified, a Health Authority at the time might have been held liable in negligence 
if, in fact, there were some special factors associated with the particular victim; in 
other words, the Health Service would not be totally immune from an action in the 
circumstances envisaged.
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II. TWO CAUSES OF ACTION
A. Misfeasance in public office
The legal practitioner might well be forgiven were he or she to believe that the tort of 
misfeasance in public office lay buried in the vaults of the Vale of Aylesbury District 
Council’s offices14 - indeed, it may not exist in Scots law.15   There is, however, little 
doubt that it is undergoing something of a resurrection and, even now, has been 
described by Brooke L.J. as a ‘newly evolving tort’.16
It is interesting, and of some practical value, to consider the reasons for this 
movement.  There are, one suspects, two main driving forces – the one following 
from the other.   Fundamentally, we have the sudden and almost exponential growth 
in the acceptance of the principle of respect for personal autonomy which, although 
perhaps expressed most vividly in the context of medical law and ethics, is a 
phenomenon that extends across the whole societal spectrum.   Autonomy is seen, at 
its simplest, as the power, and the desire, to control one’s own being, to be able to 
make decisions free from coercion and, so far as is possible, to seek self-fulfilment 
unhindered by unnecessary authority.  Consequentially, the ability to question 
authority goes hand in hand with this and the growing sense of freedom to do so is 
shown by the increasing resort to judicial review – encouraged, in part, by the coming 
into force of the Human Rights Act 1998.   The practical significance of this analysis 
is that actions in misfeasance in public office are increasingly likely to be brought as 
authority is increasingly challenged and these are even more likely to proliferate 
should they be found to provide an easier route to compensation than do actions in 
negligence. Indeed, this option may prove particularly attractive for future litigants 
given the clear policy message that has been sent out by the courts in recent years in 
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respect of limiting negligence actions against key public authorities - most notably the 
police. Add to this the deferential attitude that the judiciary has shown historically 
towards the medical profession when faced with negligence claims, and an action in 
misfeasance in public office becomes an attractive and promising alternative.    
Although the scope of the action had always been unclear and there were no 
prior definitive cases directly in point, it was agreed in Akenzua that no principle of 
law excluded an action based on the tort of misfeasance in public office simply 
because the consequence of the misfeasance was personal injury or death - a 
comparison of misfeasance and negligence within that parameter is, therefore, valid.   
The nature of the former tort was spelled out by the House of Lords in Three Rivers 
District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No. 3)17 and the 
Court of Appeal in Akenzua was content to rely for definition on the headnote which 
read:
[T]he tort of misfeasance in public office involved an element of bad 
faith and arose when a public officer exercised his power specifically 
to injure the plaintiff, or when he acted in the knowledge of, or with 
reckless indifference to, the probability of causing injury to the 
plaintiff or persons of a class of which the plaintiff was a member; that 
subjective recklessness, in the sense of not caring whether the act was 
illegal or whether the consequences happened, was sufficient.
Thus, the tort is distinguished at two levels.   First, there is the targeted 
intentional act towards an individual or, at least, a recognisable class of persons and, 
second, there is a general indifference to the fate of a broad sweep of unidentified 
persons who may be affected by an act of misfeasance – and it is with this latter limb, 
or untargeted malice, that we are mainly concerned here.  
In this respect, Lord Hope defined the necessary mental element as being 
satisfied:
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… where the act or omission was done or made intentionally by the 
public officer: a) in the knowledge that it was beyond his powers and 
that it would probably cause the claimant to suffer injury or b) 
recklessly because, although he was aware that the claimant would 
suffer loss due to an act or omission which he knew to be unlawful, he 
willingly chose to disregard that risk.  …. [T]he fact that the act or 
omission is done or made without an honest belief that it is lawful is 
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of bad faith.18
Thus, at first glance, it seems that the relatively onerous test of positive bad 
faith must apply if misfeasance in public duty is to be demonstrated.   However, Lord 
Hope had this to say later:
[I]t is sufficient for the purposes of this limb of the tort to demonstrate 
a state of mind which amounts to subjective recklessness.   That state 
of mind is demonstrated where it is shown that the public officer was 
aware of a serious risk of loss due to an act or omission on his part 
which he knew to be unlawful but chose deliberately to disregard that 
risk.   Various phrases maybe used to describe this concept, such as 
‘probable loss’, ‘a serious risk of loss’ and ‘harm which is likely to 
ensue’ …. The absence of an honest belief in the lawfulness of the 
conduct that gives rise to that risk satisfies the element of bad faith or 
dishonesty.19
Lord Hope thus seems to dilute the test both as to the likelihood of harm 
arising and, more importantly, from being one of positive choice to a negative belief.    
Indeed, this follows from the original explanation given by Lord Steyn20 to the effect 
that it was not necessary in every case to prove that the public officer knew that he 
was acting in excess of the powers granted him and that his act was likely to cause 
damage to an individual or individuals.    Moreover, it has been suggested that, where 
trained persons are involved, turning a blind eye to the complexities of a case might 
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be taken by a judge to connote recklessness.21  Given such dilution, and given that the 
tort is still ‘evolving’, it is apparent that the mental conditions justifying a claim of 
misfeasance in public office can be far removed from targeted malice and are coming 
closer to those normally associated with an action in negligence. 
That having been said, it is clear that intention calls for a higher level of 
wrongdoing than does recklessness which, in turn, is more demanding than mere 
carelessness, the last being the remit of the negligence action. The criterion of 
recklessness is crucial to the misfeasance action from a policy perspective and it will 
doubtless play a central role in any future development of the cause. While negligence 
is characterised by inadvertent careless conduct, reckless behaviour normally requires 
advertence on the part of the actor. The particular feature of a given act of 
recklessness lies in the scope and form of disregard with which the actor none the less 
proceeds. The precise scope of this criterion remains in doubt because we currently 
have too few cases by which to form a judgment.   Nevertheless, it will provide a 
powerful policy tool if the courts choose to restrict the flow of cases at any time in the 
future. They will, quite simply, raise the hurdle as to what amounts to recklessness. 
We return below to the question of where that hurdle is currently set.     
B. The action in negligence
The problem posed in the current discussion is summed up in the well-known words 
of Lord Keith:
It has been said too frequently to require repetition that foreseeability 
of likely harm is not in itself a sufficient test of liability in negligence.   
Some further ingredient is invariably needed to establish the requisite 
proximity of relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant … 
The nature of the ingredient will be found to vary in a number of 
different categories of decided cases.22
                                                
21 Cruickshank, N. 15 above, per Brooke L.J. at para.
 [43].
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And, for the purposes of  the present discussion, we can identify the ‘ingredient’ in 
the words of Lord Atkin as:
such close and direct relations that the act complained of directly 
affects a person whom the person alleged to be bound to take care 
would know would be directly affected by his careless act23.
We will see that this requirement presents a formidable obstacle in cases 
concerning public authorities – but, as will become apparent in the discussion of 
Osman v Ferguson24, it is still not the only barrier to success.   Both foreseeability and 
proximity were satisfied in Osman but there was a further hurdle which is, in practice, 
inseparable from actions involving public authorities – that of public policy.   The 
importance of this element was established in Hill25 where it was held that: ‘The 
threat of litigation against a police force would not make a policeman more efficient.   
[An action such as this] is misconceived and will do more harm than good’.26   In 
short, when the issue relates to administrative negligence, public policy is little more 
than a substitute term for the ‘fair, just and reasonable’ criterion for apportioning a 
duty of care which was established in Caparo.27
C. The actions compared
Hill has been generally regarded as precluding an action in negligence when the 
action against a public authority derives from the deeds or omissions of a third 
agency:
The authorities dealing with the police as defendants to negligence 
actions, from Hill onwards …. demonstrate with particular clarity the 
                                                
23 In Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 at 581.
24 [1993] 4 All E.R. 344, (C.A.).
25 N. 21 above.
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and Somerset Constabulary [2001] E.W.C.A. Civ. 1699 per Keene L.J. at para. [44] in particular.
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force of the public interest factors which tend to inhibit the imposition 
of liability in third agency cases.28
Thus, while it is, of course, true that exceptional circumstances may arise and 
that ‘the public policy considerations which prevailed in Hill’s case may not always 
be the only relevant public policy considerations’,29 an action in negligence of the 
type under discussion is very unlikely to succeed – at least where the police are the 
defendants.
Conversely, the tort of misfeasance in public office requires proof of the 
wrongful use of power by a public official which involves some sort of malice or 
unlawfulness.   Causation when damage results from misfeasance might, then, be 
more difficult to prove than when the accusation is one of negligence simpliciter.   
Yet we have seen that the concept of misuse of power is not restricted to intentional 
wrongdoing in that it covers the occasioning of untargeted damage and, further, that 
unlawfulness may be demonstrated by no more than recklessness.   Success in an 
action for misfeasance may, therefore, be easier than appears at first glance - subject 
however, as we have already pointed out, to policy considerations.  The problem is 
how far can, and will, the boundaries of unlawfulness be extended ?   In particular, 
one wonders if they can include a failure to take what is an otherwise lawful action. 
IV. MISFEASANCE v. NEGLIGENCE
Our purpose here, however, is to consider the merits of the alternative route via 
misfeasance and to contrast its current and possible future scope with the vagaries of 
the medical negligence action.   Each route has its own, individual snakes and ladders.
On the face of things, misfeasance might well be regarded as the more difficult 
route insofar as, at least in its original form, it requires some form of malice or 
                                                
28 K. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] E.W.C.A. Civ. 983 per Laws L.J. at para. 
[22].
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unlawfulness on the part of the tortfeasor.   In this respect, Ms Akenzua’s case 
appears relatively simple.   At the very least, the officials involved in the liberty of
Denton seem to have manipulated, if not clearly abused, their powers; the case, thus, 
stands at the clearer end of the spectrum and provides no more than the starting point 
for argument.
No actions in misfeasance resulting in personal injury had been taken before 
the judgment in Three Rivers where, as we have seen, the minimum threshold for the 
tort was reduced to subjective recklessness.   Since then, we have the Court of Appeal 
in Cruickshank30 holding that misfeasance, which is a ‘newly evolving tort’, will ‘in 
all but extreme cases ….. afford any remedy which may be due for the abuse of public 
power’.31   The size of the obstacle to be surmounted is, then, determined by the limits 
to which the definition of abuse can be stretched and the willingness of the courts to 
do so. At the end of the day, these matters turn solely on policy considerations and it 
goes without saying that the particular policy of choice will unquestionably have a 
major effect on the development - or restriction - of any particular tort.  
One significant advantage to the misfeasance action lies in the clear judicial 
pronouncement that the concept of proximity, as expressed by the identifiability of a 
victim of personal injury, is irrelevant within the tort – ‘what matters is not the 
predictability of [Denton] killing the deceased but the predictability of his killing 
someone’.32   The apparently insurmountable hurdle that has dogged so many similar 
cases brought in negligence is demolished in one sentence. 
The difficulties surrounding an action for negligence inflicted by a third party 
have already been outlined but are, perhaps, most vividly demonstrated in the present 
context by the case of K. v. Secretary of State for the Home Office,33 the decision in 
which Arden L.J. considered could not be distinguished from that reached in Palmer.  
Here, Musa, a man who had been recommended for deportation following 
imprisonment for buggery and burglary was inexplicably released from detention and, 
within a few months, raped a woman, Ms K.   Ms K brought an action in negligence 
                                                
30 N. 15  above.   Cruickshank was not, of course, associated with personal injury.
31 Per Sedley L.J. at para. [53].
32 Akenzua per Sedley L.J. at para. [21].
33 [2002] E.W.C.A. Civ. 983.
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against the Secretary of State alleging that he should have known that Musa was a 
very dangerous man who ought to have been kept in detention until he was deported.   
Almost inevitably, the claim was struck out on the grounds of a lack of proximity; 
equally inevitably, this was confirmed on appeal where Laws L.J. indicated:
[L]iability for damage carelessly occasioned to another’s person or 
property is, as a matter not of legal principle but of pragmatic reality, 
the rule not the exception where there is no third agency which 
constitutes the immediate cause of the damage; but where there is such 
a third agency, liability is the exception not the rule.34
And, although Arden L.J. was quick to remark on Laws L.J.’s qualification of the 
rule,35 the substance of  the dictum is fast assuming the status of a mantra which 
governs the law in this area.
A. Mrs Palmer’s predicament
These policy-driven interpretations of the threshold criterion of duty of care  
conspired to deprive Mrs Palmer of a remedy in negligence.   Stuart-Smith L.J. said in 
Palmer:   ‘[I]t is impossible not to have the deepest sympathy for Mrs Palmer for this 
truly appalling catastrophe’.    Most people would feel the same – and, come to that, 
would apply it to Ms K.   Indeed, the sentiment lies at the origin of this paper, the 
main purpose of which is to question whether Mrs Palmer could have succeeded had 
she taken the misfeasance road.
Clearly, there are a number of obstacles to negotiate before she can do this, the 
main one being that she would have to attribute wrong-doing of some sort, not to 
powerful and relatively impersonal organisations such as the immigration authorities 
and the police, but to a far less commanding and closer-to-home, NHS Trust.   We 
must, therefore, consider the likely position of the former before we can assess that of 
the latter – remembering that, in this respect, the policy considerations underlying the 
law of negligence and misfeasance overlap.
                                                
34 At para. [16].
35 At para. [41].
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B. Osman v Ferguson
The well known case of Osman v. Ferguson36 is probably the ‘police’ case which 
corresponds most closely to Palmer.  In this case, a known paedophile became 
obsessed with a 15 year-old boy and, having, as a consequence, been dismissed from 
his post of schoolteacher, informed a police officer that he might do something which 
could be regarded as criminally insane.   Amongst his other retaliatory actions, he 
deliberately rammed a car in which the boy was travelling - yet the police did not take 
the matter to the magistrates’ court.   Ultimately, he stole a shot-gun and injured the 
boy and killed his father.   The boy and his mother brought an action in negligence 
against the police in respect of their investigation into the paedophile’s activities but 
this was struck out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. During the course of 
the appeal, McCowan L.J. had this to say:
In my judgment the plaintiffs have an arguable case that, as between 
the second plaintiff and his family on the one hand, and the 
investigating officer on the other, there existed a very close degree of 
proximity amounting to a special relationship.37
In other words, there was no problem as to proximity.  Nonetheless, the appeal failed 
on the policy grounds which were laid down in  Hill v Chief Constable of West 
Yorkshire Police38 where it was held, in essence, that an action in negligence is not an 
appropriate mechanism to investigate the efficiency of a police force.
Appeal to the public interest, however, inevitably leads us to wonder if it does 
not, at the same time, deny justice to the individual who has suffered a wrong - in 
short, is not the appeal to distributive justice, that is so regularly heard in duty of care 
disputes, to be applied to both the claimant and the defendant ?39   
                                                
36    [1993] 4 All E.R. 344, (C.A.); Osman v. United Kingdom [1999] 1 F.L.R. 193.
37 Ibid., at All E.R. 350.
38 [1989] A.C. 53.
39 See, in particular, Lord Steyn in McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 A.C. 59. 
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A straightforward analysis of the case from the perspective of misfeasance  
leaves little room for doubt that the police in Osman knew of the dangers, that they 
had been specifically appraised of them and that they failed to take adequate action.   
Reverting to principle, they had the relevant powers and, at the same time, had duties 
to perform; an action for misfeasance in public office might still have failed on 
grounds of causation depending on the precise circumstances - but it is arguable that 
one might well have succeeded given the subsequent Three Rivers judgment. What, 
then, of policy?  There is no obvious reason why the tort of misfeasance should be 
exempt from the claim that a tort action - any tort action - is an inappropriate device 
by which to regulate and judge the operational effectiveness of public bodies. We 
have no present indication that the courts find this to be a relevant factor but, then 
again, the same was true of the negligence action until fairly recently.    
V. MISFEASANCE v. NEGLIGENCE: THE CASE OF NHS TRUSTS
That being the case, the way is open to consideration of the second limb - can 
the principles derived from police cases be applied to other public bodies - in 
particular, to NHS Trusts ?  There are, in fact, powerful reasons for suggesting that 
they ought not to be.
In the first place, the medical control of dangerous persons is a matter of 
clinical judgment which is, itself, controlled to a large extent by statute.  The criterion 
of recklessness in misfeasance may, therefore, be difficult or impossible to establish 
because the element of discretion in release decisions is greatly reduced. The very 
process of executing the required checks and balances on these decisions is likely to 
be evidence enough to rebuff a claim that there has been blatant disregard for the 
consequences of that decision.  
The most that a potential claimant could hope to achieve would be to 
demonstrate actionable negligence on the part of the Trust - and this would be 
determined on Bolam principles40 - which is, effectively, to say that, to be actionable, 
                                                
40 Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All E.R. 118.
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the decision taken would have to be one which was not supported by any responsible 
body of medical opinion.   
Secondly, the NHS Trust has no disciplinary power over its patients in the 
community and the power of recall is only as good as the monitoring systems that 
support it; in the event that the patient breaches his or her terms of release, the Trust’s 
only recourse is to enlist the help of the local authority and the police. A crucial 
question in any misfeasance claim, then, would be to pinpoint where the relevant 
reckless conduct took place. Should the focus be on the recklessness, or otherwise, of 
the original decision to release? That decision can be seen as reckless whether or not 
there is any continuing control over the patient. However, the outcome may be very 
different  if the focus falls post-release as there is, then, very much less that a Trust is 
able or can be expected to do. Alternatively, an argument in favour of collapsing these 
two elements might be made, namely, that it is precisely because a health service 
Trust has no direct power over someone once released that it is all the more important 
that release decisions are taken with due care. However, as we have already indicated, 
the degree of discretion in such decisions is severely restricted under the Mental 
Health Acts across the United Kingdom.   
Thus, it is apparent that the passage to compensation for injury done by a third 
party by way of an action against a public authority in misfeasance is likely to be 
more difficult when that authority lies within the hierarchy of the National Health 
Service.   
VI. AN ACTION IN MISFEASANCE
Remembering that Mrs Palmer’s case preceded Three Rivers, would a future 
complainant in her position have any prospect of crossing the striking out barrier in an 
action based on misfeasance ?  Would it, in short, be worth raising ?
The fundamental truth is that, as we have seen, an action in negligence 
involving an authority and a third party would be bound to fail on the simple grounds 
of lack of proximity.   Looked at comparatively, then, the answer might well be ‘yes’ 
insofar as some chance of success, as represented by the avoidance of the proximity 
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test, is better than no chance at all – and a glimmer of possible success is to be found 
in K41, discussed above.  Here, Laws L.J.42 had this to say in respect of the 
relationship between proximity and negligence:
If a public authority were to be held liable in negligence on facts like 
those pleaded here, with no true nexus between Claimant and 
Defendant …., the negligence or fault in the case would have to be 
supplied by proof that the authority had acted unreasonably in the 
public law sense ….  But if that were sufficient, without the added 
element of proximity, the result as it seems to me is that the court 
would have in effect created a category of administrative tort sounding 
in damages.   Our law, however, knows no such tort outside the 
confines of misfeasance in public office, or ….
In short, Laws L.J. positively invites the attempt. 
The chances of success would, however, be slim.   Not only would the element 
of recklessness that is so important to misfeasance be difficult to show but the ‘public 
policy’ antipathy to burdening public authorities is so evident in all the relevant cases 
that one feels it would be extremely difficult to overcome – particularly as it raises the 
courts’ special bogey of defensive medicine.43   It is unlikely that a new tort is about 
to be introduced to medical jurisprudence.  But one feels intuitively that, while the 
medical profession can well do without further threats of litigation, an action ought to 
be available to those thrust into the tragic situations endured by Mrs Palmer and Ms K 
- and Ms Akenzua has shown that it is achievable, at least in respect of the police.   It 
may well be that the courts would resist any further  attempt to replace the now vastly 
restricted negligence action with a new plaintiff-friendly tort of misfeasance. 
Nevertheless, in the words of Brooke L.J.
                                                
41 N. 27 above.   K was decided some 5 months prior to Akenzua.
42 At para. [30].
43 It is undeniable that successful litigation in this field would be likely to result in fewer potentially 
dangerous persons being released – but the tone of recent Government thinking suggests that this 
would not be seen as being wholly undesirable: see the White Paper Reforming the Mental Health 
Act (2000) and the comparable publication by the Scottish Executive Renewing Mental Health Law
(2001).
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…. (I)n matters of this kind, where public officers do not merely 
possess relevant powers but also have duties to perform in the public 
interest, it is to the evolving tort of misfeasance in public office that 
one needs to turn when an abuse of those powers is alleged.44
The problem, as has already been suggested, remains that of how far it is fair, 
just and reasonable to expand the meaning of ‘abuse’. Whatever the promise of the 
emerging tort of misfeasance may be, there are plenty of weapons in the judicial 
armoury to ensure that developments do not get out of hand. We suspect that the twin 
devices of a) a restrictive interpretation of the meaning of ‘recklessness’, and b) 
policy arguments drawn from the negligence arena, will ensure that, should 
misfeasance begin to be seen as an attractive alternative to negligence in the medico-
legal arena, it will finish up as a victim of its own success.
                                                
44 In Cruickshank, N. 15 above at para. [32].
